

# PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY

IN THE

## GAME OF CHECKERS

*Louis C. Ginsberg*

## PREFACE TO THE 2010 ELECTRONIC EDITION

*Principles of Strategy in the Game of Checkers* is in its own way a groundbreaking book, dealing, as it does, with the Dyke formation. The vast bulk of checker literature had previously followed an almost pre-set formula: there would be something on “The Move”; there would be a “Games” section, usually long columns of numbers with the barest of notes and explanation; and there might be a “Problems” section, which would always include 1st and 2nd Position and all the other usual suspects.

Mr. Ginsberg’s book is focused instead on formations, in particular, the Dyke. And although this focus seems narrow, the examples given and the methods of analysis demonstrated find a wider application in other formations as well. Explanations are copious and clear. Study of this book cannot help but improve the play of checkerists of nearly any skill level, from serious-minded beginner to aspiring champion.

Of course, the book has suffered the fate of many a checker classic: it is long out of print, and available only in the used book market, often at a price beyond the means of many a player. So, with the book having passed into the public domain some while back, we are most pleased to offer this electronic edition, completely free of charge, for the education and entertainment of checker players the world over.

The “heavy lifting” for this effort was done by one who prefers only to be known as “Mr. T.” Mr. T. did all of the scanning, OCR, proofing, and initial formatting of the book. This was a significant and labor-intensive undertaking, and without Mr. T. this electronic edition would not have come to pass.

The electronic edition is newly typeset and not simply photocopy reproductions of the original pages. While obvious typos and errors in spelling and usage have been corrected, smaller details such as consistency in capitalization and punctuation have been largely left as found, and of course the content of this edition is the same as found in the original.

Despite our best efforts, errors remain, and we wish to correct them. Please email

**`ginsbergbook@checkermaven.com`**

with your errata, comments, and suggestions.

Bob Newell  
Honolulu, Hawai‘i  
September, 2010

# Principles Of Strategy In The Game Of Checkers

A RUDIMENTARY THESIS FOR THE  
NOVICE AT CHECKERS, IDENTIFYING  
AND DEFINING THE BASIC FORMATIONAL,  
STRUCTURAL, AND STRATEGICAL  
DEVELOPMENTS OF  
SCIENTIFIC PLAY.

*BY THE RENOWNED MASTER*  
**LOUIS C. GINSBERG**  
*BROOKLYN, N. Y.*

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Louis Ginsberg

## THE GREAT GINSBERG

Louis C. Ginsberg, author of *Principles of Strategy in the Game of Checkers*, was born at Brooklyn, N. Y., in 1893—first born in a family of eight children. A frail boy with a keen mind, young Louis was attracted to checkers at an early age, and was destined to become one of the greatest players of all time. He learned his first checkers in the colorful era that marked the ascension of another renowned Brooklynite, Harry Pillsbury, to the national championship at Chess. Indeed, Brooklyn has been the cradle of many great checker stars, for it was here that such champions as Robert D. Yates, Samuel Gonotsky, and Willie Ryan were groomed in the scientific intricacies of the intellectual art.

### JIM MCENTEE—MASTER SHOWMAN

It seems that every great checker player has had a great teacher. Ginsberg's first and only tutor was the immortal King of Coney Island—the inimitable Jim McEntee. It was Mirthful McEntee who coached Louis and later introduced him to the portly Melvin Brown—prominent Brooklyn attorney, whose law offices became a Mecca for all the leading board-masters of the time. Such headliners as Artful Alf Jordan, L. S. Head, Chris Nelson, Dr. August Schaefer, and McEntee, were frequent recipients of Brown's famed hospitality and generosity towards champions of the squares. Brown's library on the game was worth a fortune, and remains intact to this day, in the Brooklyn Public Library.

McEntee was the real stimulator of the pastime in Brooklyn in the early 1900s. This celebrated expert conducted a public checker playing concession at Coney Island during the summer months, where the cream of New York City's checker playing gentry gathered daily, to enjoy the quaint wit and antics of Jocular Jim. McEntee was a one-man riot, if ever there was one. He had a genius for making people laugh from the belly up. He was inseparable from a flawlessly groomed silk topper, a checkered vest, and a polished cane—which he flourished with frivolity and uncanny sagacity. When a good crowd had gathered about his concession the players knew there would be no dull moments!

One of Mac's best remembered skits centered about a piece of chinaware, which he secured from a neighboring concessionaire. On a Sunday afternoon, when the crowd milled around his stand to watch the games, McEntee would set up a cup and saucer on the playing table, and then go into one of his typical spiels, brandishing his silver-knobbed cane as he spoke, "See that Japanese cup and saucer. As fine a cup as you ever saw, sir; all the way from old Japan, come and win it if you can; sit down and rest and play your best; bring along your wife and daughter, three good games cost but a quarter." Mac would keep up this poetical prattle for hours at a time, all the while looking after his games, and making good natured passes at his audience. Sometimes he would use his famous cane to move a checker, taking aim as if he were playing billiards, and humorously remarking, "No. 9 goes into the right side pocket in one stroke, sir." It should suffice to add that Jim wasn't very generous with his dishware! He rarely lost a game, for his resourcefulness was equal to his insatiable humor. Specimens of his games and analytical work are generously sprinkled through the pages of Lees' Guide and other standard works on the pastime.

### LOUIS MEETS THE BIG BOYS

Young Ginsberg first came into the national limelight as a player at the age of 18, when Melvin Brown matched him with Charles Lawson in a 30 game test, guaranteeing to send the winner to the 2nd National Tourney and pay all expenses. Louis won this match by a

comfortable margin, and entered the 2nd National Championship meet the youngest competitor in that battle of champions. He had the redoubtable English master, Alfred Jordan, a game down and two draws, needing only one more draw to beat the veteran, but Jordan equalized in the 4th game, and in the playoff overpowered the bushy-haired Brooklyn boy after three more draws had been contested. In another torrid clash in the same event, it took Grandmaster John F. Horr of Buffalo, N. Y., ten games to nose out scrappy Ginsberg, 1-0 and 9 draws. Louis's brilliant performance in this tourney against experts of long experience marked him as a player of bristling promise, finishing in 7th place in competition with the best in the land!

Three years later, in 1915, the Great Ginsberg—now a heavyweight of the first rank, entered the 3rd American National tourney at Chicago, beating Jesse B. Hanson and Joe Duffy. He played 15 draws with Hugh Henderson, winner of the tournament, and split 3rd and 4th prize money with Newell W. Banks of Detroit, after they had battled to an eight game deadlock.

### **1921: GINSBERG'S BIG YEAR**

Mr. Ginsberg's meteoric career was temporarily suspended from 1917 to 1920, while serving with the Armed Forces overseas in the first World War. During his stay at Brest, France, he contracted an asthmatic ailment which has dogged him ever since. Upon his return to the States, Ginsberg girded himself for more campaigns across the mystic squares, and in 1921 hung up enough victories to earn his niche in the Hall of Checker Fame. His first skirmish in that year resulted in a defeat at the hands of Harrah B. Reynolds of Buffalo, N. Y., 4 wins to 2, but Ginsberg came right back and won a similar match from Reynolds at Chicago a few months later. The Brooklyn battler then tackled the West Virginia wizard, Lawrence M. Lewis, in a 30 game stretch, winning 3-2 and 25 draws. Following this victory, Ginsberg scored the greatest triumph of his checker career, vanquishing his old adversary, Alfred Jordan, in a 30 game duel at Chicago, 3 wins to 1 and 25 draws! Only two American masters have defeated Jordan in match play—Ginsberg and Banks. Not satisfied with all these laurels, Louis journeyed to Boston and won the annual Master's tourney there, defeating Sam Levine, Willard E. Davis, Herbert Morrall, and E. C. Waterhouse, in straight heats. All this happened in 1921!

At the 5th American Championship tournament at Boston in 1922, Ginsberg won 3rd prize. In that hotly contested affair, Louis defeated Asa Long of Toledo, Ohio—winner of the tourney, but lost twice to Alfred Jordan. Ginsberg was still trying desperately for a national championship when he entered the 6th American title tourney at New York City in 1924, but somehow the Gods forgot to smile upon him. In that memorable 6th tourney, the Great Ginsberg defeated former American Champion John F. Horr, but lost to both Jordan and Samuel Gonotsky on two "fluke" wins that would have soured the disposition of a Saint! At a critical moment in his heat with Gonotsky, he bungled a three move win which might have altered the outcome of the tourney had he negotiated it. And some people say there is no luck in checkers! Sam Gonotsky won this epochal tourney, Alfred Jordan was the runner-up—though Gonotsky did not beat him, and Ginsberg was deadlocked with Horr for 3rd prize.

It can be safely stated here that these four giants of the board were so closely matched in skill and generalship all four of them were entitled to the championship! Ginsberg beat Horr. Horr had Jordan knocked out of the tournament in the semi-finals but like Ginsberg, he pulled a bloomer at the 11th hour, allowing Jordan to win the game (instead of losing it)

on a rank three-for-two shot that was heard around the world! By such startling brainstorms are championship titles frequently determined, and the Great Ginsberg has seemingly fallen a victim to them more often than any other master in the history of draughts!

## THE JINX PURSUES

After Samuel Gonotsky's sensational accession to the national championship as winner of the 6th American tourney, there was a great division of opinion among the New York City players, as to whether Gonotsky or Ginsberg was the better man. Both were lifelong residents of Brooklyn; both were champions in their own right, and both had many staunch admirers. It should be remembered here, that when comparisons are made between sterling generals of the board like Gonotsky and Ginsberg, there is no true difference in playing skills. Either was capable of beating the other with the right breaks and the desired openings. A poorly chosen diet; a moment's relapse at the board; a disconcerting incident or a prepared correction of long standing published play, are common causes for defeat among leading players. Advantages secured are, at best, of the most infinitesimal nature.

The keen rivalry between Brooklyn's famous sons of the diagonals came to a frothy head in the spring of 1925, when members of the Brooklyn Checker Club subscribed a purse of \$500.00 for a 30 game match between these seers of the silent science. By some unexplainable tragedy, Ginsberg got into a bad position in the opening game and finally lost it, and this unfortunate start cost him the contest, Gonotsky winning the match 1-0 and 29 draws! The same jinx that had haunted Ginsberg in his earlier campaigns once more took its toll.

Ginsberg's final try at a national championship was in 1929, when he participated in the 7th American tourney. Again, he reached the finals with his old antagonist—Asa Long of Toledo, only to stumble into a hoary loss that Richard Jordan hooked on James Ferrie in a World's Title match! By this time Ginsberg had passed his peak and his health was already on the wane.

## A REAL CHAMPION

Though unlucky Louis never quite made the American title, he was a game and cheerful loser, and has always been a great credit to the game. In 1931, the Brooklyn sage wrote his first and only book on the game of checkers, entitled, *Principles of Strategy in the Game of Checkers*. Upon completion of this opus, he arranged to have his lifelong friend, Maurice Platt, multigraph an edition of 500 copies for a test sale. The book had no more been released for commercial sale, when John G. Finley—then Secretary of the American Checker Association, deliberately and wantonly plagiarized the volume, by publishing the entire content of the work in his (Finley's) weekly column in the Roseville Citizen (Newark, N. J.) without Mr. Ginsberg's permission, or without notifying him in any way. This fraudulent, unethical, and unscrupulous act on the part of a responsible officer of the American Checker Association, towards a champion who had shown his loyalty to that body through a lifetime of competitive enterprise, was the opening felony in a long series of dastardly administrative practices, which precipitated the decay and ultimate dissolution of the American Checker Association. Mr. Ginsberg lost no time in filing a respectful protest with other officers of the A. C. A. relative to Mr. Finley's moral waywardness, but no action was taken. Later, this fellow Finley engineered similar acts of treachery, treason and deceit, against other members of the fraternity, and when protests were made by the victims, the apathetic and indifferent officers of the A. C. A. actually defended the "Jersey Muscle Man."

*Principles of Strategy in the Game of Checkers* is one of the finest documents ever written on the game of checkers for the novice. If Mr. Ginsberg had never written another word on checkers, and had never made any other contribution to the pastime, this book alone would fully entitle him to an honored place among the immortals of checkerdom.

Champion Ginsberg is now a permanent resident of St. Petersburg, Fla., where the bright sunshine and salty sea air keeps him happy and healthy. A great player, a great personality, and a greater teacher, this splendid little treatise on the science of checkers is a permanent literary monument to commemorate his genius in the hallowed sanctum of draughtsdom.

**WILLIAM F. RYAN**

## HOW TO STUDY CHECKERS

The standard checkerboard is comprised of 64 squares of contrasting colors, preferably green and buff, as these colors are easiest on the eyes. The official national match and tournament board is of 16 inches, having two inch squares. Checker pieces should be red and White in color, grooved, and of 1  $\frac{1}{4}$  inches in diameter.

For purposes of study, the board is numbered from 1 to 32 as depicted in Illustration 1 below. Illustration 2 shows the pieces set for play, with Black occupying squares 1 to 12. For purposes of obtaining typographical clarity, the white squares on which the pieces are set in Illustration 2 are actually the dark squares on your board. When your board is in the proper playing position, the single corner diagonal (longest straight diagonal) runs from the lower left to upper right-hand corner of the board. Black pieces always make the first move of the game.


The various model games in this book are recorded by numerals. For example: The first numeral at the top of the first column reads 11-15. That means Black moves his piece from square 11 to square 15 for his first move. The next number below it reads 22-17. That means White replies by playing from square 22 to square 17. The entire game is played out by following the scientific moves prescribed. The alphabetical digits appearing after certain moves refer the reader to corresponding letters appended after each tabulated game. A little practice will enable the learner to follow these games with much interest and obtain beneficial instruction.

**Illustration 1**

	32	31	30	29
28	27	26	25	
	24	23	22	21
20	19	18	17	
	16	15	14	13
12	11	10	9	
	8	7	6	5
4	3	2	1	

**The Numbered Board**

**Illustration 2**



**Board set up for play**

## INTRODUCTORY

It is our earnest hope that this, the first lecture of its kind, may impart a general theoretical knowledge of mid-game play—a phase that is least understood by the ordinary player.

Neither Joshua Sturges, who prepared the first really comprehensive work on the game, nor his immediate follower, Andrew Anderson, nor, indeed, the small army of more modern authors undertook the task of discussing plans and principles. Instead, the student has been confronted with countless pages of figures—important, of course, but carrying no explanation of the reason and nature of the methods of attack and defense.

The result has been that hundreds of players have memorized thousands of games and, though they may acquit themselves creditably when the play runs along their known paths, most of these players have failed to make even a good beginning in developing powers of actual analysis in the course of their play. An example of this is found in the great tendency toward the making of what is known as waiting moves in situations wherein the contestant awaits a cue from his opponent rather than pursue an organized development of his pieces. It is to be understood that waiting moves are very frequently important—and often vitally so, but there should be in every instance a reason that is grasped by the player: here again we are brought face to face with the necessity of studying tactical principles and applying them in a coordinated manner.

A good foundation of carefully selected lines of standard play should be fixed in the memory, nor have we in any degree suggested otherwise. It is, however, of basic importance that one understands the moves learned by rote, for this is closely associated with an appreciation of what to do—and why—when the play departs, as it must, from the memorized variations. In fact, it is to the genuine expert that the published compilations of games by the masters assume their greatest importance. One does not take up geometry without a thorough grounding in arithmetic, and the analogy herein is clear and significant.

Time and again we have seen a game proceed along strong, strategic lines—up to a point! When the point of departure from what the parrot in human guise has memorized arises there too often follows a move that must shock any master, living or dead. Why? Well, parrots don't analyze—nor can one expect them to, but we checker players must. First of all, then, we must learn how, remembering that all of the published openings and mid-game formations and end-game tactics are the fruit of hard analytical work by men who acquired a working knowledge of the hows and whys in this most scientific game.

Now, in undertaking a theoretical discussion and exposition of checkers, it is to be noted that each game is, like ancient Gaul, divided into three parts:

1. **THE OPENING**, which consists of the first one to eight moves in the game. 10-14 constitutes the *Denny*, while the *Black Doctor* is formed by 11-15, 23-19, 8-11, 22-17, 9-13, 17-14, 10-17, 19-10. While the opening is a definite contributing factor in the results, it is in no wise of the vast importance attributed to it by most writers.
2. **THE MID-GAME**. This is by far the most important phase of the game. It is recognized when each player has from eleven to seven pieces remaining. It is here the major engagements of the campaign occur, and the principles of checkers strategy find their greatest application. In connection with the mid-game there are some six major basic formations and four minor ones that require examination and study, for it is upon

a practical understanding of these, together with their recognition and development in the course of actual play, that, in a very large measure, spells success to the player in his effort to win or, at least, to avoid defeat.

Only after a good understanding of the meaning and method of these essentials is reached should one take up the published play, for then only will the variations played by the masters and the lesser experts stand forth in their true significance.

- 3. THE END-GAME** is recognized as such when each player has but six or fewer pieces. Owing to the prevailing tendency on the part of most writers to exaggerate the importance, especially the relative importance, of the end-game, one encounters many a player, whose mid-game work generally fluctuates between fair and poor, highly proficient in end-game play. When he escapes the pitfalls of the mid-game, such a player may, on occasion, surprise a great expert by his masterful handling of the ending.

But most games are won, lost or drawn in the course of the mid-game and the more skillfully one manages it the less important, as a rule, becomes the end-game play. While there are some—comparatively few—special end-game positions that are technical in a marked degree (and these require particular study), it is to be noted and remembered that end-games ideas, or “embryonic endings” if you will, quite regularly appear in the course of the mid-game. Furthermore, it is quite true that skill in the latter makes for a natural tendency toward correct handling of the endgame.

Winning formations—almost without exception—are based upon occupying the center of the board as quickly and effectively as possible. The ordinary player, in competition with the expert, often remarks that he “cannot seem to get started” and that his stronger opponent has occupied the most important squares. That happens because the expert has a superior knowledge, well-organized, of the formations involved in successful play.

Before proceeding with an actual examination of the mid-game, it is well to comment briefly upon each of the seven opening moves at Black’s command:

11-15, 10-15, 11-16 and 9-14 are all good opening moves, as they all follow out the idea of going to the center of the board. At first it may appear that this is not the case with 11-16, but the piece is supported by those on squares 12 and 10 and the exception is seen to be more apparent than real.

12-16, 10-14 and (especially) 9-13 are much weaker. 9-13, going to the side of the board is weakest, while 10-14 is less so and is nearer the center. 10-14, however, loses time in developing a center attack. 12-16 is not a move to the extreme side but, it allows White to cramp Black’s position on the side by replying 24-20—an attack.

Excepting in two-move restriction play, 12-16, 10-14 and 9-13 should be avoided and, when employing the two-move restriction openings, each player has the weak side once and the strong side once, thus sharing the disadvantage.

## THEORY

It is very important that Black occupy square 19 as rapidly as he can, and similarly, that White occupy the corresponding square—14. This may not at first be entirely clear.

While square 19 is the most important strategically to command, the occupation of that square must not be undertaken until, as quickly as possible, a defense has been prepared for

the piece taking up square 19. It is also essential to realize that control or supervision of square 18 is essential to successful control of the center. Thus, squares 19 and 18 are the most important ones for Black, and 14 and 15 are in identically the same position for White. Domination of these squares during the mid-game development gives the player fully eighty per cent scope and should result in a draw or win in nearly every game played.

Frequently positions arise wherein one player controls 19 and 18 while his opponent dominates 14 and 15; such positions, in which control of the center is equally divided, are usually equal or nearly so. It is to be remembered that, since the game is begun by Black, he is a move ahead of White. In other games it is often found that one player controls three of the most important squares while his adversary at the moment occupies or controls but one, the latter, however, subsequently seizing control of one of those dominated by the former and developing an equal footing in the management of the center.

All of this does not in any way spell a “system”; the only real system in checkers is hard, pleasant work and plenty of it. Nor is it a royal road, in the accepted sense of the term. Royal rank in checkers is reached by the road just mentioned; such royalty must be acquired and results neither from accident of birth nor mere memorizing of games alone. These fundamentals illustrate, however, what runs through the mind of the expert as he plays—and his thinking along these lines becomes automatic. For want of a better word it may be called intuition. When there arises danger of his opponent seizing control of an essential square he senses the danger, and moves accordingly, maintaining at least equal control of the center.

In playing over hundreds of master games as found in published works, it will be observed that in the very great majority of these games, the inevitable struggle toward 19, 18, 14 and 15 stands forth boldly and clearly.

Upon acquiring proficiency in this battle, the player will find himself reaching the end-game without one-sided casualties. Thereafter a scientific study of end-game play will bring to the student an entirely different conception of the game of checkers from that which he held formerly.

Viewing the game from the standpoint of the first player, one must have a general understanding of some definite plan of attack after the opening moves have been established. In this connection it is essential to know that when the double corner is effectively wrecked, hope has gone with it.

Next in importance to an attack upon the double corner is an assault against the single corner. Thus, arises this principle: begin with an attack upon the double corner; if countered there, direct a drive against the single corner.

This brings us to the question of how best to launch and maintain an attack upon these vulnerable spots.

Square 19 is more important than 18, as it is ideally situated for a thrust at the double corner, but the gains must be consolidated—i.e., the attacking piece or pieces must be safely supported. Analysis has shown a preponderance of wins arising from attack upon the double corner—hence, the importance of square 19 or 14 against a White attack.

We have spoken of “formations”—a term not considered adequately by the “book player”—the mere memorizer who knows only the established openings or formations. Since we have been widely considered as one of the leading exponents of published play, a word of explanation

is in order.

Although there are about twenty-five standard openings listed in the text books, one observes that many of these have the same peculiar style or form. In other words, an opening position formed by Black may be the same as one formed by White. If the basic principles underlying these are grasped by the student he will at once become progressively less dependent upon memory alone. Then, indeed, as suggested, can the player derive benefit from books of games, for he is then able to comprehend the significance of the moves played. Their language has become his.

We shall next proceed to discuss the major formation—the *Dyke*. This plan of attack figures in at least twelve different openings, and it can be definitely stated without fear of successful contradiction that this formation is responsible, primarily, for quite half of the wins scored in actual play.

**THE AUTHOR**

## “DYKE” FORMATIONS—EXAMPLE 1

11-15	23-16	9-14- <b>E</b>	32-27- <b>J</b>	3-8- <b>O</b>	22-15
22-17	12-19	22-17- <b>F</b>	4-8- <b>K</b>	26-23- <b>P</b>	10-26
15-19- <b>A</b>	25-22- <b>B</b>	7-10- <b>G</b>	29-25- <b>L</b>	19-26	31-22
24-15	8-11- <b>C</b>	27-24- <b>H</b>	8-11- <b>M</b>	30-23	14-18- <b>R</b>
10-19	17-13- <b>D</b>	11-15- <b>I</b>	25-22- <b>N</b>	15-18- <b>Q</b>	B wins

- A.** Black assumes command of 19, having in mind the development of the “Dyke” formation, which can easily be recognized as the strongest offensive from the standpoint of theory and practice. In scientific works the text indicates the “Dyke” opening.
- B.** White makes bid to control 18, one of the most important strategic points in defense, especially when Black occupies 19. It is important to know that in defending a game where the first player has taken command of 19, control of 18 by his opponent will give the latter more than an even chance to attack the piece on 19 successfully, as it breaks up the “Dyke” menace. In connection with the foregoing it might be well to observe that trying to dislodge the man on 19 before gaining some supervision over 18 very often results in a weak position for White.
- C.** Black’s destination is 15, to be followed by 7-10 when the opportunity arrives.
- D.** This is not the best move for White at this stage but is simply used to illustrate the point in positions of this type. The player who has no conception of the game other than orthodox book games which he tries to remember will invariably make the text move in similar positions for no other reason than that it looks safe. Failure to try to approach the center with hopes of getting command of 14 which will equalize the strategic point occupied by Black 19, or no attempt being made to stop Black from getting control of 15 in conjunction with the piece on 19 will lead to White being forced to the side which means defeat. Other examples are given which show different ideas relative to occupying the center of the board, etc. See examples No. 3, 4 and 5.
- E.** Black should stop White from getting to 18 before lining up 11-15 and 7-10, which will be the launching of the “Dyke.”
- F.** White can play 27-23 and take some of the center away from Black and get a better game. The text move is generally made by the non-book player who at other times moves 29-25 and Black replies with 4-8 to be prepared to defend the man on 19 by playing 8-12 if 27-23.
- G.** The characteristic move of the formation. In some of the different “Dykes” it will be noted that there is a choice between 7-10 and 6-10, hut the former is generally played, primarily because it lends more support to the “Double Corner.”

One exception should be noted in reference to the foregoing: when there is a choice between 7-10 and 6-10 as in the text and a White man happens to be on 16 then 6-10 is played to prevent White from advancing from 16-11, which would happen if 7-10 were selected. After playing 6-10 Black can play 2-6 later on and resume the original “Dyke” idea.

- H. White makes another meaningless move, apparently for no reason than that it looks safe. In positions of this nature where the player defending the “Dyke” has gone 22-17 before the man on 5 has been exchanged on to 14 as in Example #2, it is bad to make this 27-24 move as the piece on 29 gets cramped in the single corner several moves later, being unable to go to 17 as that square is already occupied.
- I. Black has now developed the most powerful of all “Dyke” formations which really had its birth with the third move of the game (15-19). Constant practice among the better class of players has proven beyond doubt that “Dyke” formations which number eleven and ten men on each side respectively are stronger than those numbering nine men on each side, as in the case of Double Corner Dyke and the 18-14 bust of the Paisley, which in turn are stronger than the formations coming from the 18-14 bust of the Second Double Corner and the Single Corner which have eight men on each side. “Dykes” with seven men on each side, which come from a direct series of exchanges etc., from the opening moves are valueless as an offensive, as they have lost the distinctive qualities of the “Major Dykes.” As a guide in the formation it can be taken for granted that where there is a man on 5 backing up the power of the piece on 14, it is strong. In the Double Corner Dyke and the 18-14 Paisley bust, there is one man less on the board in the Double Corner Sector which makes that phase of the formation lose some of its offensive value.
- J. In similar positions to this an opportunity such as 30-25 seems to be, at this stage is bad as a rule. Consider the fact that after 5-9 stopping any getaway by 13-9, White is unable to exchange 26-23 with the idea of landing back on 23 (a maneuver that saves many a game for the player defending the “Dyke”). In connection with this 26-23 type of exchange, after White jumps 30-23 it is important to know that White should have the added assistance of a man on 25; when there is no man on 27 Black is able to move 15-18 in reply. If not, and the man is on 29, as in the trunk game, Black can go 15-18 and then 18-22 which will win. If 24-20 is played in positions of this type with the intention of going 20-16, then 4-8 and after 20-16, 2-7 is played, White is forced into 12 which depreciates the value of that piece considerably. In reference to this 24-20 type of move, in playing the “Dyke” formations it is important for Black to prevent all possibilities of the defending player sneaking the man on to 11, where it can remain and be defended. If this is done the strongest “Dyke” loses its value. Of course, there is always the great exception to every hard rule, but students will recognize them as they absorb the different formations.
- The text move is generally played in conjunction with 27-24 to bring pressure against the man on 19. See examples 2, 9 and 10.
- K. Ready to defend the piece on 19.
- L. 26-23 can be played without an immediate loss, for after 26-23, 19-26, 30-23, if Black should play 15-18 then 29-25 saves square 22 for White (compare with note J). Black need not go 15-18, for 8-11 and 3-8 in these positions generally win for Black. The text move is about all White has.
- M. It is always better to go to 11 instead of 12 if possible, keeping in line with the general theory of going to the center. When there is a man on 2 in this formation, 8-11 as a

rule is much better than 8-12 (see example 3). When there is no man on 2 as in the “Double Corner Dyke” formations, 8-12 is generally the best move, as the piece on 19 can be defended properly.

- N.** This 25-22 move in similar positions very often succeeds in securing a draw, for if 14-18, then 26-23 or 27-23, etc. However, in this position neither one serves the purpose, but an example will be shown containing the principle (see Example 2), Note N.
- O.** Always keeping in mind the fact that White is getting ready to play 26-23 (the exchange mentioned in Note J), Black gets set to take the two for two, a situation that arises very often after White makes the 26-23 cut. It is also important to know that in going 3-8, Black is preparing to get some playing value out of the piece on 2, for if 27-23 is played against 3-8, then 2-7, and 7-11 after the two for two brings another piece into the front line. If 3-7 was played instead of 3-8 the value of the man on 2 is diminished for the reason that it cannot be brought into play quickly.
- P.** Playing against the “Dyke,” the two for two by 15-18 should always be anticipated.
- Q.** This two for two is always a threat against the 26-23 cut in all positions of this type. In many cases while it does not win, it succeeds in breaking up the White defense to the extent that the draw becomes very difficult.
- R.** This is a typical example of a position resulting from a strong “Dyke” formation.

## “DYKE” FORMATIONS—EXAMPLE 2

11-15	25-22	5-14	22-17- <b>J</b>	11-27	24-19
22-17	8-11	29-25- <b>D</b>	2-7- <b>K</b>	31-24	15-24
15-19	17-13	11-15- <b>E</b>	32-27- <b>L</b>	7-11	28-19
24-15	4-8- <b>A</b>	27-24- <b>F</b>	7-11- <b>M</b>	30-25- <b>O</b>	20-24
10-19	22-18- <b>B</b>	7-10- <b>G</b>	27-23- <b>N</b>	12-16	19-16
23-16	9-14- <b>C</b>	25-22- <b>H</b>	3-7	26-23	11-20
12-19	18-9	8-12- <b>I</b>	23-16	16-20	25-22
Drawn					

- A.** As pointed out in Ex. 1 if 9-14 is played White can equalize and break up the “Dyke” threat by playing 27-23. To prevent this, Black moves 4-8 to support the man on 19 to hold that square.
- B.** White goes to 18, the square that is all important for Black in this formation.
- C.** It is necessary to remove White from 18 if the “Dyke” is to be developed properly—at the same time note should be taken that the exchange has taken away the man on 5—a compensating return to White for losing 18 temporarily.
- D.** White moves to the center, to be ready for any emergency.
- E.** As explained before, getting ready to go 7-10 next and get the strong “Dyke” formation.
- F.** This move when playing against the “Dyke” is generally made with the intention of going 32-27 next, to bring pressure against the man on 19. In conjunction with this idea (27-24 and 32-27) 25-22 is also played and occasionally before 27-24 has been made, in the event that it might be important to deflect the piece on 27 to the center. But 25-22 would not be good in this particular case, as Black would reply with 14-18 and threaten to go for a king.
- G.** Black is again fully developed. Attention is called to the occupancy by Black of the squares 19, 15, 14. However, the square 18 is more or less under the supervision of White because Black cannot approach 18 from 14 in safety.
- H.** White’s destination is the center and at the same time setting up a temporary attack, for if 2-7, White springs 21-17, 14-21, 30-25, 21-30, 31-27, 30-23, 27-2, White wins. Note should be taken of this trap, as it comes up repeatedly in the formation and while it does not win for White always, it puts a damper on the “Dyke.”
- I.** As pointed out in Ex. 1, when there is a man on 2 in the “Dyke” formation it is safe to go to 11, if not, it is better to go to 12. This is illustrated a little more clearly in Ex. 3—8-11 would permit a three for three by 21-17 followed by 22-18 which will draw for White—this idea comes up very often and wrecks many a strong game.
- J.** White, by moving 32-27 here, would give Black a chance to play 12-16 and White would be forced to go 24-20 (if 22-17 then 16-20 grips the Whites and wins for Black) and then 14-18 is very strong for Black. It will be noticed that this is one of the exceptions, where White gets a man on 11 playing against the “Dyke” but it can be easily seen that after 27-24 and 15-18, Black is strong.

- K.** Bringing his piece up to assist the man on 19, anticipating 32-27 as pointed out in note F.
- L.** The text move is selected in this defense because the piece on 31 is needed for that square later on.
- M.** Getting ready for 27-23, a move White has been planning since note F.
- N.** White also has an opportunity to play 26-22 at this stage for a draw. The idea is noted in Ex. 1 but is brought out more clearly here, thus: 26-22, 14-18, 27-23, 18-27, 22-18, 15-22, 24-8, 12-16, Drawn.
- O.** About the only thing that saves White. This difficult draw can be checked back to the fact that Black has developed a strong mid-game formation.

### “DYKE” FORMATIONS—EXAMPLE 3

11-15	8-11	7-10- <b>A</b>	15-24	1-5- <b>J</b>	24-28
22-17	17-13	25-22	26-22- <b>E</b>	18-9	31-26
15-19	4-8	11-15	11-15- <b>F</b>	5-14	15-24
24-15	22-18	22-17	32-28- <b>G</b>	30-26- <b>K</b>	26-23
10-19	9-14	8-11- <b>B</b>	3-8- <b>H</b>	8-11- <b>L</b>	28-32
23-16	18-9	27-23- <b>C</b>	28-19	26-22	23-19- <b>O</b>
12-19	5-14	19-24- <b>D</b>	15-24	11-15- <b>M</b>	Drawn
25-22	29-25	28-19	22-18- <b>I</b>	23-19- <b>N</b>	

- A.** This move is played before 11-15 to allow White to move 25-22 (which would be bad against 11-15) in order to admit a principle that could arise from other “Dyke” formations.
- B.** As explained in Example 1, this is a spot to go 8-11.
- C.** 27-24 would run into play along the lines shown in Example 2.
- D.** This move is very good now, if the man on 11 was on 12, the idea would be bad, bringing out the important point of keeping to the center. The main feature about planting a man on 24 where the piece can be defended is the fact that the scope of the White pieces is limited and the man on 24 acts in the capacity of a sniper, which White must quiet as soon as possible. This same rule would apply if Black could place a man on 22 or 23 in different positions and defend the piece properly. In defense, Black must see that White cannot do the same by occupying squares 9, 10, or 11 with the same telling effect.
- E.** Played with the intention of attacking the Double Corner, to go 22-18 as soon as possible.

Another form of defense when a Black man is on 24, as in this position, is for White to move 23-19, with the intention of going 19-16 to try to prevent Black from placing a man on 20 which would be able to co-operate with the man already on 24 and attack the White Double Corner. In reply to this 23-19 defense, the piece on 3 is generally played to 8 and then to 12 which will temporarily stop White from going to 16, and at the same time give Black the choice afterwards of moving 11-16 to press an attack on the double corner or to move 11-15 and try to hold the center. After 3-8 is played, White moves 26-23, hoping to go 30-26 next and exchange 19-16 at the first opportunity. The game proceeds with 8-12 and 30-26 and Black, with three good moves at his command, plays 1-5, which brings up an ending which comes up quite often. After 1-5, 32-28, 11-15 (avoiding 19-16), 26-22, 5-9, and 22-18 followed by 19-15, draws neatly.

- F.** Black takes the center in an attempt to crowd the foe to the side and incidentally stop him from attacking the man on 14 as much as possible. What might appear as a good idea at this stage is 11-16, 22-18, 16-20, 18-9, 24-27, and getting a king, but it is not much good in this position.

- G.** White must remove the man on 15 so pressure can be brought against the man on 14, with the intention of weakening the double corner by forcing the man on 1 out, a position that occurs very often, and one that the student should tab. The question might be raised here, if 32-28 is good here, why not play it a move earlier when apparently the same idea is used. By playing 32-28 before 26-22, Black gains time thus: 32-28, 11-15, 28-19, 15-24, 26-22, now Black can go 24-28 and after 22-18, play the game a piece down which would be bad for White. Playing 26-22 before 32-28 forces Black to move the man on 3, after which the sacrifice of the man as pointed out previously is of no value.
- H.** Black realizes pressure is being brought to bear on the man on 14, so decides to bring reinforcements up to get on 15 again, with all haste. 15-18 loses by 22-15, 10-26, 17-10, etc.
- I.** Taking the man out of 1 is compensation for White's apparently weak position.
- J.** Necessary to keep any advantage in the game. If Black tries 6-9, 13-6, 2-9, expecting 17-13 and then 1-6 would be correct. After the 6-9 exchange, 18-15, 10-26, 17-10 is a getaway for White, an important snap to know in these positions as it comes up pretty often.
- K.** Once again White starts for the man on 14.
- L.** Black must go to 15.
- M.** We are back again to practically the same order that prevailed earlier in the game at note E. It is important to do the same thing now that was done before to remove the man on 15 from White's path, so force can be brought against the double corner.
- N.** A very common ending arising from these formations. Black must move away with the man on 24, and White sacrifices the man again and threatens to attack the piece on 14 once more.
- O.** In many of these positions the man on 14 cannot be attacked successfully by squeezing 22-18, but as a general rule in these endings, 23-19, as in this game, does the trick.

## “DYKE” FORMATIONS—EXAMPLE 4

11-15	23-16	4-8- <b>B</b>	18-9	11-15	32-27- <b>K</b>
22-17	12-19	23-16	6-22	25-22- <b>G</b>	9-14- <b>L</b>
15-19	25-22	11-20	26-17	5-9- <b>H</b>	26-23- <b>M</b>
24-15	8-11	22-18- <b>C</b>	8-11- <b>E</b>	30-26- <b>I</b>	2-7- <b>N</b>
10-19	27-23- <b>A</b>	9-14- <b>D</b>	29-25- <b>F</b>	7-10- <b>J</b>	23-19
Drawn					

- A.** This move is generally adopted by experts in match and tournament play (30-25, another defense, is shown in Ex. 5) and is made solely with the purpose of taking the center from Black. If Black should reply with 11-16, then the power of the man on 19 cannot be used for building up a “Dyke” formation and we have a different game from the “Dyke” proper.
- B.** Study of this type of game in preference to 11-16 will help the student more, as the play resulting from it is not of the close and complicated variety.
- C.** White steps up to the center and would probably take 14 also, when the opportunity presents itself.
- D.** 8-11 at this stage is often played, holding off on the two for two by 9-14. If White plays 17-14, then 11-15 gives Black a good game. Instead of 17-14, however, White plays 32-27 and then if Black should go 11-16, White can go 17-14 in safety, making it essential for Black to take the two for two by 9-14, as in the trunk game. Black removes the menacing man on 18 with the intent of later on bringing his man on 8 eventually to 15.
- E.** As explained, to the center at all cost.
- F.** White is bringing up help to be ready when 18 is going to be fought for. Incidentally, it is recalled to mind that a man is not placed on 19 or 14 unless it can be defended intelligently, which tells us why 17-14 is not made.
- G.** After this, White would go 17-14 if allowed.
- H.** Black senses the embarrassment if White should go 17-14.
- I.** Generally played in positions of this type, as after going 26-23 (when it does come), the man on 17 is of more value than being on 13, as it helps the man (which will then be on 23) to indirectly attack the square 18.
- J.** 7-11 can also be played but in similar positions the text is generally taken, the idea to go 9-14 next.
- K.** This move is sometimes played before 30-26 but the result is the same. Black should not go 9-13 and give up square 14.
- L.** It is interesting to note that Black occupies 14, 15, and White holds supervision over 18 and direct control over 19—an equal distribution of the of the board which draws the game.

- M.** After this move the game has been reduced to the ending, as White threatens 23-19.
- N.** Black plays 2-7 (expecting White to exchange 23-19) and then intends to go to 15 later.

## “DYKE” FORMATIONS—EXAMPLE 5

11-15	12-19	9-13- <b>D</b>	11-16- <b>H</b>	12-19	2-20
22-17	25-22	18-14- <b>E</b>	27-23- <b>I</b>	27-24- <b>L</b>	Drawn
15-19	8-11	13-22	6-9- <b>J</b>	20-27	
24-15	30-25- <b>A</b>	25-18	31-27- <b>K</b>	32-16	
10-19	4-8- <b>B</b>	8-12- <b>F</b>	16-20	7-10- <b>M</b>	
23-16	22-18- <b>C</b>	29-25- <b>G</b>	23-16	14-7	

- A.** This move is a defense used against the “Dyke” by many of the good players and is typical of different games where the move is employed to help advance the man on 22 to 18 (keeping up with the theory of taking the center) without suffering the immediate loss of the square 18. This can be appreciated by noting that instead of 30-25 (29-25 allows 11-15 forcing 17-13 and Black gets the powerful “Dyke” by 4-8, etc.) if White plays 22-18, then 9-14, 18-9, 6-22, 26-17, 11-15—White has theoretically lost supervision over square 18 and Black can start building a “Dyke”—compare with note D.
- B.** In positions similar to the trunk, where Black occupies 19 and it is quite evident that White may be able to control 18 and 14, which will make it impracticable for Black to control 15—then 4-8 is played as in the text, the idea being to eventually place the man on 12, and the man on 11 will be moved to 16, which is an indirect attack levelled against the double corner. However, another way to meet this impending 22-18 move is to go 11-15; White must attack by 27-23 and 4-8, 23-16, 8-12, 22-18, hoping Black will jump 15-22, 25-18, 12-19, which will allow 17-14 and control of the center—Black jumps 12-19 first, 18-11, 7-16, and the White threat is broken up.
- C.** White establishes himself on the most important square in defense of the “Dyke,” when an opponent has a man on 19.
- D.** It is now useless for Black to try 9-14, because White would jump back on to 18. Black would like to go 8-12, but in view of the three for two by 18-14, it’s impossible. The next best thing is to go 9-13, hoping for 17-14 or 25-22, and then 8-12. Incidentally, White does not go 17-14.
- E.** As a rule, in these positions where this 9-13 type of move is made, 18-14 is generally played to allow the exchange, for two simple reasons; one is that the man on 29 does not get cramped and can be used; and the other, removing the threat of the man on 13 against a single corner that is not too strong.

It is bad to go to 17-14 in similar positions until the man from 11 has been moved to 16, because the piece on 11 working in harmony with the man on 13 succeeds in wrecking White’s single corner. The explanation which follows is technical: Black moves 8-12 (if White tries 27-24, then 11-16, and the two for two by 7-10 is good for Black) (if 27-23, 6-10, 23-16, 10-17, 21-14 12-19, 31-27, 13-17, 25-21, 19-23, 26-19, 17-22, Black should win). White plays 25-22, 19-23, 26-19, 6-10, 21-17, 1-6, 27-23, 6-9, 28-24, 11-15, etc. Black wins—Anderson.

25-22 can be played but after 8-12, 29-25 is made and then after Black moves 11-16 which is in keeping with the Black formation in this type of the “Dyke,” White can

move 17-14 after 27-23 is made, eliminating the loss previously mentioned. This type of game is also developed from playing 11-16 at note D.

- F.** As pointed out before, it is better to keep the man on 11 as long as possible.
- G.** In some books, 27-23 is played first followed by 11-16 which goes back into the trunk.
- H.** If 6-9, in positions like this, 27-24 should always be made attacking the piece on 19. Black cannot take the two for two by going 11-16 because the man has been moved from 6 to 9. As pointed out before, in these positions, the line-up by 12, 16, 19 is general and tends to threaten the Double Corner.
- I.** General protection and expecting to attack the man on 19 with one of the men on 31 or 32 later.
- J.** This move is sometimes played after 16-20, it is immaterial. Its purpose is to temporarily attack the single corner and bring the man on 1 into play.
- K.** In positions of this sort, where there is a question of whether to go 31-27 or 32-27 and where Black on his next move is compelled to go 16-20 and exchange (allowing White to get in 27-24 after 31 or 32 has been made would not be good for Black on account of having to weaken his position by taking the two for one in return by 7-10, etc.) it is better to go 31-27. After White takes the two for one by 27-24, as a general rule Black regains the piece by jumping into 20 as in the trunk game and the position is even. But on the other hand, if White goes 32-27 and Black cuts 16-20, 23-16, 12-19, and White takes the two for one by 27-24, when Black regains the man by taking the two for two by 7-10, he lands on 19, a more advantageous position, a condition which at times will be disastrous to the player going 32-27.
- L.** In the event of a move like 27-23 here, the sacrifice of the man as 19-24, 28-19, 20-24, should always receive consideration. It wins many games, as it would this game.
- M.** Black takes the piece and the position is even.

## “DYKE” FORMATIONS—EXAMPLE 6

11-16- <b>A</b>	22-17- <b>C</b>	7-10- <b>H</b>	27-23	7 -16	17-10
24-20	10-15- <b>D</b>	20-16- <b>I</b>	9-14- <b>L</b>	22-18	6-15
16-19- <b>B</b>	25-22- <b>E</b>	2-7- <b>J</b>	30-25- <b>M</b>	15-22	25-4- <b>P</b>
23-16	8-12- <b>F</b>	32-27- <b>K</b>	5-9- <b>N</b>	24-15	White
12-19	27-24- <b>G</b>	4-8	16-11- <b>O</b>	10-19	Wins

- A.** The Bristol opening which often assumes a “Dyke” formation.
- B.** Black takes command of 19 and expects to develop the “Dyke” if the opportunity offers.
- C.** A weak move, but generally made by the uninformed. Again the importance of 22-18 is noted, for if Black has visions of the center, the man on 18 must be removed by the 9-14 exchange (10-14, although sound, leads to a complicated formation of a different nature).
- D.** Black begins to mass his pieces as shown in previous examples.
- E.** White must try to establish his position and break up the coming “Dyke.”
- F.** This move must eventually be made to support the piece on 19. If 7-10, trying to establish the formation too quickly, White goes 20-16 and spoils the “Dyke” as pointed out in Example 1.
- G.** The ever present defense in these formations, to be followed by 32-27, when the time comes, as explained before.
- H.** The text move is given to illustrate how a strong formation can be wrecked. It is proper to go 4-8 for if 32-27 comes next, 7-10 and the “Dyke” is very strong. If White tries 20-16 after 7-10 then 3-7 is the key move for the attack, eliminating the trunk game.
- I.** Threatening square 11, explained in Example 1.
- J.** Black gets ready to attack the piece on 16, having in mind 4-8 followed by 8-11. If White plays 16-11, 7-16, 24-20, then 3-8, 20-11, 19-23, etc.
- K.** White’s destination is 18.
- L.** It is quite evident something must be done to stop the impending attack against the man on 15.
- M.** Threatening the three for two. This type of move in similar positions should always be considered as a threat against 18, a strategic point.
- N.** Nothing else to be done.
- O.** White removes a very important piece in order to get a very brilliant stroke which wins for White. This idea comes up in different forms and should be studied carefully.
- P.** This game has been won in actual competition across the board between experts.

## “DYKE” FORMATIONS—EXAMPLE 7

11-16	9-14- <b>B</b>	4-8- <b>F</b>	3-8- <b>G</b>	11-16	6-13- <b>J</b>
24-20	18-9	23-16	23-16	20-11	29-25
16-19	5-14	8-12	8-12	7-16- <b>H</b>	10-14
23-16	25-22- <b>C</b>	32-27	31-27	22-18- <b>I</b>	25-22
12-19	8-11- <b>D</b>	12-19	12-19	1-5	2-6
22-18- <b>A</b>	27-23- <b>E</b>	27-23	27-23	18-9	23-18- <b>K</b>
Drawn					

- A.** Always an important move to offset the possible advantage of a Black man on 19. Going after the man on 19 at this stage is useless, as it should be noted that if White runs the man off three times, Black will support the piece successfully and square 19 will be in Black’s possession with a good game.
- B.** Access to 18 is important to establish a “Dyke.” 10-14, 18-15 leads to another formation which will be discussed later on.
- C.** Running the man off by 27-23 at this stage will gain nothing as Black will continue to occupy 19.
- D.** Black must go 8-12 and then 7-11 if 22-17 is played if the “Dyke” idea should prevail.
- E.** White can run the man off now. In these positions where there is no man on 12 and Black moves 8-11 as in the text, it is possible to stop Black from forming the “Dyke” idea by running the man off.
- F.** The exchange by 11-16 is generally put off until there is nothing else to be done, otherwise White gets the center.
- G.** See note F.
- H.** Attention at this time should be directed back to note B. In the event that 8-11 is played, the same idea of running the man off is good and if 4-8, 23-16, 8-12, 32-27, 12-19, 27-23 is played, Black cannot go 3-8 to defend the piece (as 23-16, 8-12, 21-17, 18-14 White wins) so must exchange 11-16. In positions of this sort where the exchange by 11-16 is made before the piece has been run off twice, the advantage should rest with the White pieces.
- I.** White has succeeded in stopping Black from getting the center and gets an even game. Endings of this type come from the style of game as noted in note D, going to 11 instead of 12.
- J.** 5-14 is also played in these endings. After 5-14, 29-25, 10-15, 25-22, 15-18, 22-15, 14-17, 21-14, 6-10 drawn.
- K.** This two for two generally winds up the positions coming from running the man off as in the trunk game.

## “DYKE” FORMATIONS—EXAMPLE 8

11-16	18-9	8-11- <b>E</b>	27-24- <b>T</b>	12-16- <b>O</b>	22-15
24-20	5-14	29-25- <b>F</b>	14-18- <b>L</b>	26-22- <b>P</b>	10-26
16-19	25-22	4-8- <b>G</b>	20-16- <b>M</b>	16-20- <b>Q</b>	14-9- <b>S</b>
23-16	10-15- <b>A</b>	25-22- <b>H</b>	11-27	27-23- <b>R</b>	Drawn
12-19	22-17- <b>B</b>	2-6- <b>I</b>	32-14	19-26	
22-18	6-10- <b>C</b>	22-17- <b>J</b>	1-5	30-23	
9-14	17-13- <b>D</b>	8-12- <b>K</b>	31-27- <b>N</b>	15-18	

- A.** The game is recognized as one of the “Dyke” formations although starting with the Bristol opening.
- B.** Bringing pressure on a double corner that does not look too strong.
- C.** As pointed out, 7-10 is not played whenever a 20-16 reply looms up on the horizon.
- D.** In a position as in the trunk where a man has been moved from 6 to 10, 17-13 is always an attacking move.
- E.** As pointed out in Example 3, going to the center, for if 27-23 in reply then the 19-24 principle comes into play.
- F.** White does not go down 13-9 until the piece can be protected in a suitable manner. If there was a White man on 22 then 13-9 would be good, for if 1-5, 22-17, 14-18, 9-6, 2-9, 17-13, and White would win.
- G.** The piece must be available for square 12 if necessary.
- H.** One of the instances where 25-22 is played before 27-24 and bringing a man into the midst of things.
- I.** Black must prevent 13-9 if the “Dyke” is to be preserved.
- J.** When the Black man is on 14 and there is no piece on 5, 22-17 is generally a forceful move.
- K.** The exchange by 19-24 is also played, White replies with 26-23 and Black must go 24-28 (11-15, 13-9 White wins), 23-18, 14-23, 27-18, which gives White command of the center of the board, but Black can draw. This type of 19-24 exchange where White commands the center is not to be recommended because any advantage must rest with White. The text is natural, following out the general procedure in the “Dyke” formation and forcing White to do the playing.
- L.** Occupying 18 when the piece can be defended is permissible, following the general prescribed rules of going to the center.
- M.** The safest move as it compels 1-5 after the stroke.

- N.** This move in reality is a part of the 20-16 idea as played at the previous note. Consider the fact that if Black replies 15-18, 27-24 equalizes the position, bringing us to the main idea. The text is played to take out the man on 15, so White can attack the man on 10 and get a two for one by 14-9 later on.
- O.** If 3-8 then 27-24, 8-11, 30-25, 19-23, 26-19, 11-16, 25-22, 16-23, 24-19, 15-24, 28-19, drawn.
- P.** This position comes up in different forms and should be studied—mainly the idea of forcing the two for two later on.
- Q.** If 3-8, 27-24 (not 27-23), 16-20, 22-18 and Black might get into trouble.
- R.** The sequel to the 31-27 move at note N, Black cannot stop White from taking the man on 15 out of play.
- S.** This very interesting game has been played by experts in the past.
- T.** 27-23 is met by 3-8 (19-24 followed by 26-22 and 32-28 as in Example 3 will probably win for White) and brings the following idea:

3-8	30-23	11-20	31-27	22-26	17-14
23-16	8-12	23-19	18-22	16-11	
12-19	32-27	20-24- <b>V</b>	27-24	26-31	
26-23	15-18	27-20	11-15	11-7	
19-26	20-16- <b>U</b>	7-11	20-16- <b>W</b>	14-18- <b>X</b>	Drawn

- U.** White must remove the man on 11—this idea comes up very often.
- V.** 7-11 allowing the shot by 19-16 and 27-24 is unnecessary.
- W.** This position is very common in all types of games and is shown in another example. It is practically a standard position with experts. See Example 10—note F, at end.
- X.** Forced.

## “DYKE” FORMATIONS—EXAMPLE 9

9-14	24-15	2-6- <b>E</b>	32-27- <b>L</b>	11-27	24-19
22-17	10-19	29-25- <b>F</b>	3-7- <b>M</b>	31-24	15-24
11-15	17-10	7-10- <b>G</b>	22-17- <b>N</b>	7-11	28-19
25-22	6-15	25-21- <b>H</b>	9-14- <b>O</b>	30-25- <b>Q</b>	20-24
15-19- <b>A</b>	21-17- <b>B</b>	8-12- <b>I</b>	27-23- <b>P</b>	12-16	19-16
23-16	5-9- <b>C</b>	27-24- <b>J</b>	8-11	26-23	11-20
12-19	17-13- <b>D</b>	4-8- <b>K</b>	23-16	16-20	25-22
Drawn					

- A.** Known in the books as the “Double Corner Dyke,” another type of “Dyke” formation.
- B.** White would like square 14. At times in defending this type of the “Dyke,” 30-25 is played with the idea of exchanging 22-18 in an attempt to dominate square 18, the strategic point in defense, when there is a black man on 19. Replying to 30-25, 7-10, 22-18, 15-22, 25-18, 2-6 and Black defends his man on 19 against all attack.
- C.** Necessary to control 14 in order to develop the formations.
- D.** Always an attacking move, when the double corner has been weakened by the piece on 6 being removed and the man on 9 cannot go to 14.
- E.** The natural move in the “Dyke” formation, although 1-6 can be played and is popular with some of the experts. 9-14 is bad, in fact, one of the main points in building up the “Dyke” is to hold the man back on 9 until later on in the game.
- F.** Necessary to get to 21 to work in conjunction with the man on 22, to help bring pressure against the double corner.
- G.** The characteristic move of the formation which can easily be recognized.
- H.** Getting ready to go 22-17 when the opportunity presents itself.
- I.** This is not a spot for 8-11 (no man on 2) as 27-23, 19-24, 28-19, 15-24, 22-18 and Black’s game is not good.
- J.** As explained in a previous example, the text in conjunction with 32-27 brings pressure against the man on 19, which reveals itself as the game proceeds. 27-23 at this stage is very often used by experts, the purpose being to get the win which is shown in note M. From the standpoint of the reason for the move, the idea itself is somewhat different from the “27-24, 32-27, 27-23 series of moves” as shown in the game, due to the fact that Black is always unable to go 9-14. After 27-23, 4-8, 23-16, 12-19, 32-27, 3-7 (before and now 9-14 runs into note M) (loss) 22-17, 1-5\*, a move that is necessary to dominate square 18, for if 26-23, 19-26, 30-23, then 15-18 or if 27-24 (as played in an attempt to get the note M loss) Black can still go 15-18, 24-15, 10-19, 26-23, 18-27, 31-15 and 7-10 draws. It is worthy of note that if Black fails to go 1-5 as starred, the loss cannot be avoided. In connection with this 1-5 move and the type of game it produces by dominating square 18 as pointed out, it can be seen by examining the trunk game carefully that it is impossible to utilize the idea in the latter case—see

note O. In view of the fact that the 27-23 move is different from the 27-24, 32-27, 27-23 idea, as shown in the trunk, and that its counterpart 6-10 move cannot be used intelligently at this stage, it might be considered by some to be technical to a degree. However, the principle of how Black avoids the loss as in note M is highly instructive and can be applied to many positions of its particular type.

- K.** Attention is called to this position, which should be compared with Ex. 10 at the 20th move. In the latter position the piece is on 25, while in the text the man is on 12. This difference affects the playing of the 9 men “Dyke” formation (as of the “Double Corner Dyke” and “Paisley Dyke”) in the following manner: When playing the Black pieces, 9-14 is weak and generally leads to a loss, as described in note M, as the double corner can be attacked successfully. In playing the “Dyke” with the White pieces, when the man is on 25, then 24-19 can be played without suffering a weak game. The reason for this can be attributed to the fact that White is a move behind, on account of Black having the first move, and as the game depends on mathematical accuracy, it can be appreciated that an additional move would help to alter the result of a certain position.
- L.** Not 31-27—the man is of more value on square 31 later on.
- M.** As mentioned in note K, 9-14 loses, as follows: 9-14, 27-23, 3-7, 23-16, 12-19, 22-17, 7-11 (if 8-12, 31-27 and then 7-11), 31-27, 8-12, 27-23, 11-16, 24-20 (this ending is very common), 15-18, 20-11, 18-27, 26-22; 27-31, 11-8, 12-16 (hoping for 31-26), 30-25 and black loses, on account of being unable to approach square 23. 9-14, if played before 4-8, can avoid the loss just described by the following: 9-14, 32-27, 3-7 (not 4-8), 24-20 (if 27-23, 14-17 and Black avoids the main loss), 19-24, 28-19, 15-24, 27-23 and White is very strong, an idea coming up in different games.
- N.** White waits for the Black man to go 9-14 before squeezing 27-23, so the double corner can be weakened successfully.
- O.** If 1-5 was played here, White would not go 27-23 for after the two for two by 8-11, Black has the better game. After 1-5, White goes 26-22 for no other reason than to force 9-14 and then 27-23, 19-26, 30-23, 7-11, 24-19, 15-24, 28-19, 11-15, 31-26 15-24, 22-18 draws. Forcing Black to move 9-14 at some stage, in the midgame or later, is necessary if White expects to get an equal position, as illustrated in the trunk game or in the foregoing.
- P.** Generally the sequel to the White moves from Note J, but at times 26-22 in these positions will also give White equality of position, when Black is forced to move 14-18 in reply. 26-23, an exchange pointed out in a previous example, at this stage loses and develops the following interesting position:

26-23	15-18	20-16	22-25	17-14	6-10
19-26	23-19	15-24	27-24	10-17	Black
30-23	18-22	28-19	25-30	21-14	Wins
7-11	27-23	1-5*	23-18	8-11	
24-20	11-15	31-27	14-23	16-7	

**Q.** The position now is the same as in Ex. 1.

## “DYKE” FORMATIONS—EXAMPLE 10

11-16	21-14	16-20	29-25- <b>D</b>	3-26	15-11
24-19	9-18	31-27- <b>C</b>	11-16- <b>E</b>	30-23	20-24- <b>I</b>
8-11	23-14	8-12	25-22- <b>F</b>	6-10- <b>H</b>	27-20
22-18	16-23	26-23	16-19- <b>G</b>	23-19	10-14
4-8	27-18	6-9	24-15	9-13	11-7
18-14- <b>A</b>	12-16- <b>B</b>	25-21	7-10	18-15	6-9
10-17	28-24	1-6	14-7	2-6	Drawn

- A.** This break known among experts as the “Paisley” bust, is recognized as one of the “Dyke” formations.
- B.** The procedure is similar to Example 9. The moves in defense played by Black should be compared with those played by White in Example 9. If necessary, two boards can be used at the same time so that the main points should not be missed.
- C.** In Example 9 reference has been made to 1-6 which is the exact counterpart move of 32-27 at this stage. In the case of the former, the White man is on 29 but in this game if 32-27 is played instead of 31-27 the Black man is on 8 which advances to attack against the White double corner. As proof of this, the move (32-27) is never used in important contests by good players.
- D.** 24-19 can be played here in safety. In connection with the foregoing, the reader should compare this position with Example 9, note K, where its counterpart move 9-14 is shown to be weak. Try to apply the winning moves as used against 9-14 in Example 9 against 24-19 in this game.
- E.** As in Example 9, trying to force the double corner.
- F.** White can play 24-19 and Black replies with 6-10, the general pressure against the “Dyke” formation at this stage of the game, which White plays 30-26, 10-17, 21-14, and Black continues pressure against the man on 14 by 2-6. 26-22 is played (if 25-21, 6-10 forcing 32-28 which wrecks the double corner) and Black replies with 7-10, illustrating one of the instances where a player shifts his attack from the double corner to the single corner side. After 7-10, 14-7, 3-10 (the counterpart exchange of 26-23, explained in Example 1), the play should be studied as the ending crops up in 25% of actual games played. The play continues thus: 25-21, 9-13, 18-15, 10-14, 15-11, 6-9, 22-18, 13-17, 11-7, 17-22, 7-2, 22-26, 19-15, 16-19, 23-16, 14-23, drawn. The ending comes up colors reversed—see Example 8, note T.

Instead of 24-19 or the text move, 30-26 is played to anticipate 6-10 by 25-22 and the two for two, then 16-19 is the sequel to the defense, as played in the trunk game, bringing the game down to the ending.

- G.** As explained in Example 9, note O, the idea is to force the man on 9 to 14 in order to be able to attack the double corner. In this counterpart position, where White holds the man on 24 as long as possible (a valuable point in the “Dyke” formations), Black takes his compensation via the stroke by 16-19, a maneuver that succeeds in piercing the double corner.

- H.** After this the ending assumes a definite form.
- I.** Draws at once, white being held at bay for the impending two-for-one line up via 6-9, but 10-14 is met by 27-24, 20-27, 32-23, forcing black to pull his chestnuts out of the fire by the following clever finish: 6-9, 22-18, 13-17, 11-7, 17-22, 7-2, 22-26, 2-6, 26-31\*, 6-13, 31-27, 18-9, 5-14, 13-17, 27-18, 17-10, 18-15, Drawn.

## “DYKE” FORMATIONS—EXAMPLE 11

11-15	21-14	16-23	26-23- <b>J</b>	2-7- <b>P</b>	23-7
22-18- <b>A</b>	9-18	27-18	6-9- <b>K</b>	25-21	3-19
15-22	23-14	11-16- <b>G</b>	24-19- <b>L</b>	7-11- <b>Q</b>	14-10- <b>U</b>
25-18	8-11- <b>C</b>	28-24	7-11- <b>M</b>	31-26- <b>R</b>	
12-16	29-25- <b>D</b>	16-20	25-22- <b>N</b>	1-6- <b>S</b>	
18-14- <b>B</b>	4-8- <b>E</b>	32-27- <b>H</b>	11-16	19-15- <b>T</b>	
10-17	24-19- <b>F</b>	8-12- <b>I</b>	30-25- <b>O</b>	16-19	Drawn

- A.** The single corner will be discussed under another formation, but is used to show one of the “Dykes.”
- B.** Used very often in important play. It cannot be considered a good type of the formation because the man on 14 can be harrassed more than usual, making it more of a defensive than an offensive “Dyke.” A very important thing to know, and one not understood by everyone, is the fact that when taking a break as in the text, there is no man on 25, so in order to protect the piece on 14 there must be a Black man on 16, and vice versa. Continue 6-10, 29-25, 10-17, 25-21, 1-6, 21-14 and Black cannot go 6-10 again on account of the two for two, forcing him to move 16-20. If he would attack the man on 14, which gives White an opportunity to move 26-22 and support the man on 14. Very often players will take the 18-14 break as against 8-11, or in similar positions, and then wonder why they lost the piece on 14.
- C.** Played with the idea of getting to the center as explained in a previous example.
- D.** White must get ready to support the man on 14 and get a “Dyke” if possible.
- E.** Permissible now as it threatens 16-19.
- F.** Illustrating another type of the “Dyke” which has only 8 men on each side. Not as good as the “Double Corner Dyke” or “Paisley Dyke.”
- G.** Forcing White to protect 19.
- H.** In the formations of only 8 men on each side, 32-27 is generally selected so that the piece on 31 can be deployed to 22 if necessary.
- I.** Black is getting ready to play 7-11 later on and try to attack the double corner as in previous examples.
- J.** A necessary part of the formation as explained before.
- K.** Characteristic of the player opposing the “Dyke,” bearing indirectly on the key man on 14.
- L.** In the 8 men “Dyke” where the man has been played from 32 to 27, the piece on 24 is not held back.
- M.** Getting ready to apply some force against the double corner.

- N. No reason why White should not go to the center.
- O. The destination is 21, supporting the man on 14.
- P. This type of move is frequent, playing against the 8 men “Dyke” formations, as it tends to attack the double corner.
- Q. A very ingenious move, but one that is very common in this type of the “Dyke”, the main idea being 19-15 is temporarily checked by 16-19.
- R. About the only move to give White a fighting chance—14-10, 9-14, 18-9, 5-14 and Black wins.
- S. The only forcing move Black has.
- T. This position comes up from several different openings and while it is supposed to be a draw for White, the ending is very difficult to play.
- U. The saving link in the position, which helps White considerably. This game is shown to compare the difference between an offensive and a defensive “Dyke.”

## “DYKE” FORMATIONS—EXAMPLE 12

11-15	11-16	16-23	8-12	7-11	1-6
24-19	18-14- <b>A</b>	27-18	27-24	29-25- <b>D</b>	30-26
15-24	9-18	12-16	16-20- <b>B</b>	2-7- <b>E</b>	7-11
28-19	23-14	26-23	32-27	24-19- <b>F</b>	19-15
8-11	10-17	4-8	6-9- <b>C</b>	11-16	16-19
22-18	21-14	31-27	25-22	25-21	Drawn

- A.** Another type of the 8 man “Dyke” previously mentioned.
- B.** Black could take the break by 16-19 but it is not necessary, as this type of position is better for the Black men.
- C.** The same idea is used here as in the previous example, bringing indirect pressure on the piece on 14 and getting ready to attack the double corner by 7-11, etc.
- D.** Makes little difference whether you play this before 24-19 or after, as they both must be made. Some players might object to 24-19 on the ground of 20-24, 27-20, 12-16, 19-12, 11-15 and playing with a man short, but the position is no doubt a draw.
- E.** As pointed out in Ex. 11, this move comes in against this type of game.
- F.** At this stage the game can be recognized as the same type that is arrived at in Ex. 11 and is played along the same lines.

### “DYKE” FORMATIONS—EXAMPLE 13

11-16	9-14- <b>C</b>	10-19	6-10	3-7- <b>O</b>	23-26- <b>R</b>
22-18	18-9	17-10	32-27- <b>H</b>	22-17	31-22
16-19- <b>A</b>	5-14	7-14- <b>F</b>	4-8	19-23- <b>P</b>	11-15
24-15	22-17- <b>D</b>	29-25- <b>G</b>	27-24	24-19	22-18
10-19	7-10	8-11	8-12- <b>I</b>	15-24	
23-16	27-24	25-22	17-13- <b>L</b>	28-19	
12-19	2-7- <b>E</b>	11-15	1-6- <b>M</b>	7-11	
25-22- <b>B</b>	24-15	22-17	26-22- <b>N</b>	30-25- <b>Q</b>	Drawn

- A.** Taking the “Dyke” when there is a White man on 18, sacrifices all of the characteristics of the formation, as explained in the previous examples.
- B.** The usual procedure, going to the center, intending next to move 29-25 threatening the square 15, an important point for Black when he has a man on 19.
- C.** In order to preserve the principle of the “Dyke.”
- D.** This move and 27-24 always come in these positions to break up the double corner.
- E.** A type of the formation that is a little different. Black wants to avoid the 6-15 jump as 14 cannot be defended along the general lines of the formation.
- F.** Black, by jumping this way, can temporarily stop the onslaught against 14 until reinforcements are brought up. This kind of “Dyke” has been referred to as the 7 men type and for offensive purposes is valueless.
- G.** En route to attack the double corner, the characteristic gesture against these “Dyke” formations.
- H.** Another part of the chain as shown in previous examples, the spot to be occupied is 24, the general strategic point to menace the Black formation.
- I.** Reference has been made regarding going to the center in these positions. It has been stated previously, in one of the examples, that when there is no man on 2, 8-12 is better than 8-11. If Black moves 8-11, White practically wins on all variations. Here is an illustration:

17-13	3-7- <b>J, K</b>	26-22	7-10	22-18	Doubtful
1-6	30-25	10-14	27-24		Black
31-27	14-18	24-20	18-23		Draw

- J.** If 11-16, 24-20, 14-18, 20-11, 18-23 looks like a White win.
- K.** 3-8, 27-23, 11-16, 24-20, 8-11, 26-22. White wins.
- L.** Attacking the double corner, notice the similarity of the procedure with the latter part of Ex. 11 and 12.

- M.** The man on 13 should always be stopped when there is danger of the man crowning and getting in back of the Black pieces.
- N.** If White tries the same tactics as in variation I, 31-27, 3-7, 27-23, 15-18 draws, the piece by being on 12 instead of 11 does not hamper the man on 15 from going to 18 as in the foregoing. Both variations should be reviewed (note I) and the play in this note; the position comes up often.
- O.** This forces White to go 22-17 to hold the advantage, if any.
- P.** If 7-11, 31-26, 19-23, 26-19, 11-16, 30-25, 16-23, 24-19 and White wins. This ending should be compared with the one arising from note Q, which only draws.
- Q.** An old idea, offering the man on 19 intending to go 25-22 and 22-18 which would win—19-15, 11-18, 31-26, 23-27, 30-25, 18-23, 26-19, 14-18 and Black draws on account of occupying 27. In note P a similar position loses because the man is on 23 instead of 27.
- R.** Sacrificing a man as in the text and squeezing 11-15 comes up in various different forms and succeeds in making the opponent lose time in the development, a principle almost as important as trying to steal a piece.

## “DYKE” FORMATIONS—EXAMPLE 14

11-15	21-14	16-23	29-25	1-6	26-23- <b>J</b>
22-17	9-18	26-10	11-15- <b>F</b>	25-21	
8-11	23-14	6-15	21-17- <b>G</b>	15-18	
17-14- <b>A</b>	12-16- <b>B</b>	25-21- <b>D</b>	4-8- <b>H</b>	14-10	
10-17	24-19- <b>C</b>	15-19- <b>E</b>	31-26- <b>I</b>	6-15	Drawn

- A.** This break is known in the books as the “White Dyke,” an opening considered weak by experts past and present. The fact that it is not played by the good players in tournaments would emphasize its inherent weakness. The attention of the student has been called to the fact that occupancy of 15 by an opponent when White has a man on 14 is highly undesirable if a good “Dyke” is planned. This game illustrates clearly how a “Dyke” formation fails to function properly when the opponent has command of the center.
- B.** Getting a man on 19, so as to be able to go 6-9, is the general idea in positions of this type, which will explain a previous remark about the value of occupying 18 when the opponent has 19 and vice versa.
- C.** Made primarily to stop pressure from being brought against the piece on 14 as described in note B, or a position of a similar nature.
- D.** Protecting the man on 14 and getting ready to bring the piece on 29 into play. If 25-22, then 4-8 followed by 1-6 or 2-6, threatening the man on 14 by 6-9. In a position of this type where the defending “Dyke” player has control of the center as of 11-15, etc., it is immaterial whether he goes 1-6 or 2-6, as the piece on 14 is generally run off twice.
- E.** Black is now dominating the game, stealing the “Dyke” idea for himself.
- F.** Establishing the man on 15 to hold supervision over the square 18, while 1-6 and 6-9 is being planned.
- G.** Expecting to go 25-21 eventually, a type of game generally adopted by White when Black occupies 15 and 19 and vice versa. See Example 5, note B.
- H.** If 1-6, 31-26, 6-9, 25-21 and 26-23 gets the original idea in the game.
- I.** If 25-21, then 15-18, 30-25, 7-11 is not as good for White as the game in trunk.
- J.** White has had the laboring car all through the game, for the reason that the man on 14 could not be protected as in other types of “Dyke” shown previously.

# **“DYKE” FORMATIONS—EXAMPLE 15**

9-13	13-22	4-8	12-19	12-19	6-10- <b>D</b>
24-20	25-11	29-25	27-23	17-13- <b>B</b>	
11-15	8-15	15-19- <b>A</b>	8-12	10-15- <b>C</b>	
22-17	21-17	23-16	23-16	20-16	Drawn

- A.** This illustration is given to show when Black can place a piece on 19 with apparently only two pieces in reserve for defense of the man. There must be a White man on 17.
- B.** White must remove the man from 17 before going 32-27 to attack the man on 19.
- C.** Black gains a move, an idea that is utilized in many different games, due to the White man being located on 17. If there was no White man on 17, the man on 19 would be lost to Black by the runoff via 27-23.
- D.** If 7-10 is played, 16-11 is very strong for White.

# **“DYKE” FORMATIONS—EXAMPLE 16**

11-15	12-16	10-17	6-10	1-6- <b>D</b>	Etc.
22-18	29-25	21-14	25-21	26-23	
15-22	9-13	16-20- <b>B</b>	10-17	13-17	
25-18	19-14- <b>A</b>	23-18- <b>C</b>	21-14	31-26	Drawn

- A.** Another illustration of commanding square 14 with apparently only two pieces in reserve, as in Example 15.
- B.** Forcing 23-18 or 25-21, for if 24-19 White loses the man by 6-10 and running it off three times.
- C.** Gaining a move in the development while the piece is removed from 16, as in the counterpart in Example 15
- D.** If 13-17, 24-19 (not 26-23, as Black goes 17-22), 1-6, 27-23, and later 31-27, getting the game back in the trunk.